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RECENT CASES

TORTS-COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

Is

NOT APPLICABLE TO

SINCE IT IS PUNITIVE IN NATURE.

Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit District (Cal.
1969).
Julius J. Helfend was struck and injured by the defendant's
bus. He recovered a personal injury judgment jointly against the
bus driver and the Southern California Rapid Transit District. On
appeal, the defendant Rapid Transit District argued that it was
entitled to show that the plaintiff had been partially reimbursed
for his medical expenses by his own medical insurance carrier, and
that this should mitigate the award against it. This contention was
in direct conflict with the collateral source rule, which states that
[wihere a person suffers personal injury or property damage by
reason of the wrongful act of another, an action against the
wrongdoer for the damages suffered is not precluded nor is the
amount of the damages reduced by the receipt by him of
payment for his loss from a source wholly independent of the
wrongdoer.'
On appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal, held,
reversed: the collateral source rule is not applicable where the
defendant is a governmental agency. 2 Helfend v. Southern
California Rapid Transit District, 275 Adv. Cal. App. 150, 79
Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969).
The court, in reaching its decision, relied primarily on City
3
of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construction Co., where the

California Supreme Court first enunciated the concept of public
entity exclusion from the collateral source rule The argument
1. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 349, 170 P.2d 448, 450 (1946),
accord, United States v. Price, 288 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1961), A.H. Bull Steamship Co.,
Inc. v. Ligon, 285 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1960), Lewis v. County of Contra Costa, 130 Cal.
App. 2d 176, 278 P.2d 756 (1955), Royer v. Exkovitz, 358 Mich. 279, 100 N.W.2d 306
(1960), Stone v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 166, 391 P.2d 179 (1964).
2. The holding did not entitle the defendant driver to any reduction of the judgment
against him, since the exception accrues solely for the benefit of governmental agencies.
275 Adv. Cal. App. 150, 154, 79 Cal. Rptr. 920, 922 (1969).
3. 66 Cal. 2d 217, 424 P.2d 921, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1967).
4. Unlike Helfend, Souza involved a breach of contract action. The City of Salinas
sought to mitigate a judgment against it due to the defendant construction company's
successful cross-complaint by introducing evidence of the construction company's
settlement with one of its suppliers. The California Supreme Court concluded that the
collateral source rule was not applicable against a public entity. 66 Cal. 2d 217, 231, 424
P.2d 921, 928, 57 Cal. Rptr. -337, 344 (1967).
The Court had previously held that Souza's cross-complaint was contractual in
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was advanced in Helfend that Souza could be distinguished as
holding only that the collateral source rule is inapplicable in
actions for breach of contract. The court refused to read Souza

so narrowly, and applied it to the personal injury case at issue,'
holding that the Rapid Transit District "was entitled to mitigate

the award against it by showing how much of the medical expense
had been paid by the plaintiff's insurers." 6

The Souza-Helfend exemption of public entity defendants
from the collateral source rule is based on the syllogism that

recovery of punitive damages is not allowed against a public
entity, recovery based on the collateral source rule is punitive in
nature; therefore, recovery based on the collateral source rule is

not allowed against a public entity.7 The major premise of the
syllogism can be substantiated by both law' and reason, ' and is
generally accepted as true. 0
nature. Souza & McCue Construction Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 508, 511, 370
P.2d 338, 340, 20 Cal. Rptr. 634, 636 (1962). It is not entirely clear that the collateral
source rule applies in contract cases. In United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co.,
the court stated
[w]e have been unable to find a single case in which this collateral source rule
has been carried over to contract damages. In the absence of binding precedent
to the contrary we prefer to follow here the ordinary contract measure of
damages rather than the rule in tort cases.
223 F.2d 49, 54 (7th Cir. 1955). But see Lee v. Burrell, 51 Mich. 132, 16 N.W.309 (1883).
In a fact situation similar to Souza, the Michigan Supreme Court allowed recovery,
but apparently based it on the tort of misrepresentation. Valentini v. City of Adrian, 347
Mich. 530, 79 N.W.2d 885 (1956).
5. 275 Adv. Cal. App. 150, 153, 79 Cal. Rptr. 920, 921 (1969).
6. Id. at 154,79 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
7. 66 Cal. 2d 217, 227-28, 424-P.2d 921,926-27, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342-43 (1967).
8. CAL. GOV. CODE § 818 (West 1966) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for
damages awarded under section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages
imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant.
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3294 (%Vest 1954) provides:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or
implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages
for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
Although section 818 of the Government Code was not in existence early enough to
control in Souza, the court cited it as reflecting prior existing law. 66 Cal. 2d 217, 228
n.l, 424 P.2d 921,926 n.l, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342 n.l (1967).
9. To impose punitive damages against a public entity "would impose an unjust
burden upon the innocent taxpayer without directly penalizing the wrongdoer. The punitive
purpose would thus be frustrated." City of Salinas v. Souza & MeCue Construction Co.,
66 Cal. 2d 217, 228, 424 P.2d 921,926, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342 (1967).
10. In Hines, Municipal Liability for Exemplary Damages, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
304 (1966) it is stated that
[a]lthough the law is not altogether free from doubt on the subject of
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The minor premise, however, is not so well settled. The court
in Souza relied on three authorities to support the proposition that
"the collateral source rule is punitive in nature."11 The first of
these was United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co. 2 in
which the court refused to extend the collateral source rule to a
contract action. In justifying its conclusion that the rule should
properly be limited to tort law, the federal court commented that
"[t]his rule of tort law has a flavor of punitive damages.''13 The
Souza court next cited a treatise 4 that suggests that the rule
results from "a feeling of indignation or resentment and a desire
to punish as such.' 5 Finally, the third authority 6 remarked that:
The constantly recurring refrain, with strong overtones of
moral outrage, is that the defendant is a wrongdoer who should
not be "let off" from any portion of what is his due by the
of his victim or those who stood by him
exertions and foresight
7
in his hour of need.1
While the effect of the rule cannot be considered as synonymous
with punitive damages, it does have undertones of punitive
purposes. The rule cannot be justified strictly as compensatory;
thus the court's conclusion that it is "punitive in nature" seems
warranted.
But conceding the valididty of both the major and minor
premises of the syllogism, the conclusion may not logically follow.
It is punitive damages that are not allowed against a public entity,
not damages "punitive in nature." There may be a distinction
with a difference. A true exemplary award is granted "for the
sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant,"' 8 and
the total judgment typically exceeds the amount required to
compensate the plaintiff for his injuries." The collateral source
municipal liability for exemplary damages, it is a settled principal that
exemplary damages may not be recovered against a municipal corporation, nor
a state, in the absence of statutory authority.
11. 66 Cal. 2d 217, 228, 424 P.2d 921,926-27, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342-43 (1967).
12. 223 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1955).
13. Id.at 54.
14. 2 F. HARPER& F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS, § 25.22, at 1345 (1956).
15. Id.
16. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL.
L. REV. 1478 (1966).
17. Id. at 1483.
18. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3294 (West 1954).
19. Id.
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rule never causes the defendant to be liable for more than the total
amount of the actual damages he has caused, albeit without
regard to any collateral recovery by the plaintiff. Undertones of

a punitive purpose may exist, but in order for a public entity to
take advantage of its immunity from punitive damages the current
California statute requires that the damages be "imposed

primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant. 20 The conclusion that damages "punitive in nature"
are exemplary and thus not applicable to government entities does
not logically flow from the premises. Even though public entites

are exempt from punitive damages, they are not necessarily
exempt from damages "punitive in nature."

The Souza-Helfend rule has the potential of inducing further
changes to the collateral source rule in California. If the rule is

viewed as sufficiently "punitive in nature" to classify it as an
exemplary damage as to governmental agencies, it would seem to

be no less "punitive in nature" as to individuals, and therefore
should also be classified as an exemplary damage as to
individuals. 21 If the operation of the collateral source rule is

viewed as an exemplary award as to individuals, then by statute
a plaintiff is entitled to invoke the rule only when he can show
the necessary "oppression, fraud, or malice"22 that is required to
recover punitive damages. Applying this argument to the facts of

Helfend, it seems clear that the plaintiff would be faced with a
considerable undertaking to show the necessary ingredients
required to justify exemplary damages.? Such an undertaking was

apparently not attempted'
If the courts adopt this approach, it is clear that for all
practical purposes the collateral source rule would cease to exist.
20. CAL. Gov. CODE § 818 (West 1966) (emphasis added).
21. While there may be the policy consideration of the public interest to consider
when dealing with governmental agencies, from a logical standpoint, the characterization
of a recovery as an exemplary award should not be dependent upon whom it falls.

22.

CAL. CIVIL CODE

§ 3294 (West 1954).

23. California is cautious in allowing punitive damages. In one case, involving a
drunken driver, the court conceded the defendant may have been grossly negligent and his
conduct "wilful, reckless, wrongful and unlawful," but still insisted on a showing of actual
malice to sustain a cause of action for punitive damages. Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App.
2d 517, 527-29, 322 P.2d 933, 939-40 (1958).
24. If the argument was made, and there is no indication that it was, it did not
prevail, since the defendant bus driver did not escape application of the rule as to him.
Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit District, 275 Adv. Cal. App. 150, 154, 79
Cal. Rptr. 920,922 (1969).
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It could be utilized only in those cases where sufficient malice
exists to justify punitive damages. If punitive damages are
available, any additional recovery by way of the collateral source
rule would probably be submerged within the exemplary damage
award. Technically, the rule would still apply in this limited
situation, but its importance would be severely diminished.
The California courts may decide that abandonment of the
collateral source rule is the proper outcome. There has been
pressure in some areas2 5 to modify or abolish the rule. The
California courts now have an available tool if abolition is
desired. The final coup' de grace could be administered by the
simple expedient of extending the Souza-Helfend concept of the
''punitive nature" of the collateral source rule to apply to
individuals as well as to public entities. While it would not result
in the complete repudiation of the rule, it would render it virtually
impotent as a recovery device. The collateral source rule is not
without its supporters, however, and abolition may not be the
ultimate goal.
The basic idea supporting the rule is that the tortfeasor
should be made to pay for the harm he has caused, even though
the plaintiff may recover twice. Circuit Judge Huxman stated:
Where a part of a wrongdoer's liability is discharged by
payment from a collateral source, as here, the question arises
who shall benefit therefrom, the wrongdoer or the injured
person. No reason in law, equity or good conscience can be
advanced why a wrongdoer should benefit from part payment
from a collateral source of.damages caused by his wrongful
act. If there must be a windfall certainly it is more just that
the injured person shall profit therefrom, rather than the
25. The area of automobile insurance has supplied much of the impetus. The KeetonO'Connell proposal, as well as adopting a nonfault concept, would exclude overlapping
benefits by subtracting collateral benefits from the calculated gross loss. R. KEETON & J.
O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 278, 306 (1965).
Another proposal calls for legislation that would allow the jury to hear evidence of
the nature and extent of any collateral benefits received by the plaintiff. The reason
advanced for the proposal is not to allow the recovery to be reduced by this amount, but
to better enable the jury to assess the inconvenience caused by the defendant's conduct,
when this is a factor in determining the total award. THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
INC., RESPONSIBLE REFORM 21 (No. 8, 1969).
Some strongly attack the rule. Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The
CollateralSource Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1964). Others feel that in some cases it
may operate "as an instrument of what most of us would be willing to call justice."
Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. REV.
669, 695 (1962).
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wrongdoer shall be relieved of his full responsibility for this
wrongdoing?'

The feeling that the defendant deserves to pay for the harm
he causes is closely related to the argument of deterrence." This
argument is based on the notion that people will be more careful
in their behavior if they know they will be held accountable for
the damages of their misbehavior.28
Other reasons for support of the rule are that the "legal
'compensation' for personal injuries does not actually
compensate, ' 29 in that some instances the plaintiff has paid for
3
the benefit, 30 or that the plaintiff was the intended donee . Still
another argument is that when the collateral source has limits,
such as "sick pay," allowing the defendant's penalty to be
26. Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958). In justifying the rule, a
California Court of Appeal case from the same district (second) as Helfend contained the
statement that "[tihe wrongdoer is not permitted to obtain a windfall by reason of the
principle that an injured person should be compensated only once." Dodds v. Bucknum,
214 Cal. App. 2d 206, 214, 29 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1963).
27. This seems to be at least part of the underlying reason that prompted the
statement in opposition to changing the collateral source rule in the automobile insurance
field, when a special committee of the American' Insurance Association reported that
changes in the rule could
lead eventually to a system or systems under which the cost of motoring would
be shifted to taxpayers and groups of insureds not directly related to motoring.
For motoring to pay its own way, and the committee believes it should,
automobile insurance must bear the primary burden of compensating for
economic loss.
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,

REPORT OF SPECIAL COMNITEE TO STUDY AND

EVALUATE THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE
REPARATIONS, 4 (1968). The argument apparently is that automobile insurance should bear
the primary burden of compensation so that those who are in the best position to influence
accident rates-the insurance companies and the insured premium payers-will also be the
ones most severely affected financially by a rise in such accident rates. This would provide
a built-in incentive to keep the overall cost of automobile accidents to a minimum. If
collateral sources were allowed to absorb large portions of the economic loss, there would
be little direct built-in deterrence by way of automobile insurance rates.
28. Even in their argument against the collateral source rule, Harper and James
concede this point: "Let it be granted, however, that civil liability is an effective incentive
to care, at least in some circumstances." 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF
TORTS, § 25.22, at 1347 (1956).
29. Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
968 (1955). The court clarified the quoted sentence by adding that "[nlot many people
would sell an arm for the average or even the maximum amount that juries award for loss
of an arm." Id.
30. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 349, 170 P.2d 448,450 (1946).
31. Kite v. Jones, 389 Pa. 339, 132 A.2d 683 (1957).
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plaintiff later when he becomes
reduced results in penalizing the
reasons3 2

sick for other legitimate

The critics of the collateral source rule, however, also raise
persuasive arguments. One indication of the lack of a logical
origin of the rule is provided by a string of Alabama cases3 3 The

court summarily dismissed claims for lost wages when it was
shown that the plaintiff continued to receive his salary even
though he was absent from work. Application of the collateral
source rule was not even considered. Harper and James argue that
all that remains as a reason for the rule is the desire to punish.34

Another writer has questioned what actually constitutes the
"harm" for which the plaintiff is being compensated

5

The crux

of the arguments against the rule is that it is contrary to the
doctrine of avoidable consequences in the law of damages," as

well as contrary to the compensatory theory on which tort law is
based 7 Anything beyond compensatory damages should be dealt
with separately as punitive damages3
32. The plaintiff finds that he has entirely used up or substantially reduced the
benefits that would otherwise be available to him, and he has to cover these later expenses
himself. The end resut is that the plaintiff receives less than full compensation for his
combined losses, while the defendant fortuitously escapes his full liability. Tinker,
Guaranteed Benefits v. Keeton-O'Connell Plan, 548 INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL 732, 735
(1968); accord, Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P.2d 127, 131 (1948).
33. Jones v. Keith, 223 Ala. 36, 134 So. 630 (1931), Whiddon v. Malone, 220 Ala.
220, 124 So. 516 (1929), Travis v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 183 Ala. 415, 62 So. 851 (1913),
Montgomery & E. Ry. Co. v. Mallette, 92 Ala. 209, 9 So. 363 (1891).
34. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OFTORTS, § 25.22, at 1345 (1956):
What is left under this head, then, springs from a feeling of indignation or
resentment and a desire to punish as such. Surely there is no place for such a
notion in any philosophy of social insurance. It has no acknowledged place
even in tort liability based on fault, for the theory of damages here is purely
compensatory.
35. Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The CollateralSource Rule, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 741,749 (1964):
The very issue in controversy is what constitutes the "harm" to be
compensated; does it include salary not in fact discontinued and medical
expenses never incurred, or is it exclusive of insurance proceeds or expenses
from which the injury relieves the victim?
36. Maxwell, The CollateralSource Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46
MINN. L. REV. 669, 670 (1962).
37. Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 1478, 1484 (1966). Fleming states that:
so cavalier a compromise with the fundamental axiom that the hallmark of
tort damages is compensatory, is but a sad reflection of the fact, in this
instance at least, American courts have shown themselves less than equal to
the task of responsible social engineering, allowing themselves to be distracted
from urbane decisions about loss distribution by appeals to a simplistic and
irrelevant morality.
38. Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The CollateralSource Rule, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 741,749 (1964).
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However, there may be a third alternative, 3 one which
satisfies most of the arguments on both sides. The right to
indemnification could be extended to the collateral source. One
writer explains the process as follows:
Broadly, it may take one of three possible forms: first,by
conferring on the collateral source a right to indemnification,
whether by subrogation, assignment or an independent claim
against the tortfeasor; second, by the latter returning the
benefit to his benefactor, as in the not infrequent case of
conditional loans or gifts reverting to the lender or donor; and
third, in the case of otherwise continuing benefits, like periodic
payments,by terminating these as soon as tort damages assure
full indemnity for the future 0
The application of the concept of indemnification would leave the
primary burden on the wrongdoer, where many feel it rightfully
belongs, and the collateral source would be called upon only if the
primary source of recovery is unable to pay the entire judgment.
No longer will the plaintiff receive a double recovery, nor will the
defendant escape his full liability. Furthermore, the plaintiff's
collateral source will remain intact for possible future use.
If indemnification had been available to the plaintiffs
medical insurance carriers in He/fend, the court could have found
nothing more than compensatory damages in the judgment
against the Rapid Transit District. There would be no double
recovery on which the "punitive in nature" characteristic could
be based. The plaintiff would recover the full amount that he was
entitled to, and the defendant tortfeasor would shoulder the entire
burden of his wrongful act. Any benefits advanced to the plaintiff
by the medical insurance carriers could be recovered when the
plaintiff received his judgment against the defendants. Thus the
insurance carrier would be required to pay only if the primary
source, the tortfeasor, was unable to discharge the judgment
against it.?' The question of the applicability of the collateral
source rule would not even arise.
39. Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 1478, 1484 (1966).
One of the endemic flaws of the debate over the collateral source rule is

precisely that it has been blinkered by the fatalistic assumption, borne with
resignation, that the choice is limited to either set-off-which would confer a
windfall on the ill-deserving defendant-or not set-off-which would confer a
corresponding windfall on the wronged plaintiff.
40. Id. at 1485.
41. The result of allowing the third party insurance carrier to escape primary liability
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The Souza and Helfend decisions could represent a major
turning point for the future of the collateral source -rule in
California. Although there have been no indications that the
holdings will be so extended, they could be extended to apply to
individuals as well as governmental entites, so that the rule would
virtually cease to exist. The question turns on the policy
considerations of where the burden of compensation should lie,
and the desirability of sanctioning double recovery by certain
plaintiffs as against allowing the defendant to avoid full liability.
The middle course, while perhaps not a total solution, is
indemnification. The extremes are the abolition or the retention
of the collateral source rule as it now exists for private defendants.

Regardless of the outcome, Helfend has caused the option of
abolition to be within easy grasp of the court.
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can be justified by the beneficial effect that it would have on the plaintiff's insurance rates,
as well as its effect on the insurance rates of the public in general. It is the insurance rates
of the blameworthy defendant that should be increased, not those of the blameless plaintiff.
A contrary argument can be made based on the idea that insurance companies are in
business to take risks, and that if they are assured of indemnity, they are no longer taking
the risks that the policy holder is paying them to assume. But this argument fails to
consider the ultimate effect on the parties involved. If the plaintiff's insurance carrier is
made to be the primary source of recovery, then the insurance carrier is assuming two
risks: (1) that the insured will cause an accident, resulting in injury to himself and others,
and (2) that some third party will cause an accident, resulting in injury to the insured.
Insurance rates tend to increase proportionally to the amount an individual has caused to
be paid out in the past, regardless of whether it was his fault. Thus, a person could be
involved in several accidents in which he was not at fault, and find his insurance rates
increasing. If the insurance company is allowed the right of indemnification, then the risks
it is assuming are: (1) that the insured will cause an accident, resulting in injury to himself
and others, and (2) that some uninsured and insolvent third party will cause an accident,
resulting in injury to the insured. In cases where the defendant is insured or sufficiently
solvent, the plaintiff's insurance company can collect any expense it has incurred from the
defendant's insurance carrier or the defendant himself. The net result is that the plaintiff's
insurance rates remain unchanged, since his insurance company has not incurred an
expense as a result of his injuries, and, assuming the defendant had insurance, his rates
may well increase, since his insurance company had to pay for the harm that he caused
to the plaintiff. This seems to be the proper result.

